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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 19 2014

(3)

27 October 2000

(U) Background Paper

(U) SUBJECT: South Korea Reactions to Recent Improvements in US-North Korean Relations.

1. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (U) For President Kim Dae Jung, the rapid thawing in U.S.-DPRK relations, evidenced by the recent visit to Washington by Special Envoy Cho Myong-nok and by Secretary of State Albright's return visit to Pyongyang, is another step forward in the process of ending cold war confrontation on the peninsula and inducing North Korea to change the way it interacts with the outside world.

c. (U) Although some Koreans, in and out of government, have raised worries that these new developments in North Korea-U.S. ties could cause inter-Korean relations to lag, the official position espoused upon President Kim's words and stresses that the U.S. Secretary of State's visit was made possible by the June inter-Korean summit. South Korean (KS) government authorities maintain that improvements in KN-U.S. relations will accelerate the thawing of tensions on the Korean peninsula and ultimately contribute positively to inter-Korean relations. The lull in North-South engagement is seen as tactical, a result of the prior rapid pace of events and reflecting a need by KNU to "catch their breath."

d. (U) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) officers have officially welcomed the U.S. visit also as creating a mood of détente and establishing peace on the peninsula. MOFAT, however, is keeping a careful watch on the situation, since changes in relations between the U.S. and North Korea would have a serious bearing on North-South relations and on the political situation on the Korean peninsula.

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: FC1
Date of Source: Oct 00

DIA S U.S.C. 552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

+ OSO

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3);

10 U.S.C. 424

OR-M-2678

13-M-0830

DOS

NO OBJECTION TO FULL RELEASE

RETURNED TO ORIGINATING AGENCY - Dept of Defense

14-M-3327

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Declassify: Deny in Full:

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 1.4(b)(d) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

MDR: 14 -M- 3327

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1. (S) While there is across-the-board support for improvement in U.S.-KN relations, there is at the same time some lingering apprehension within and without the government. Although a Ministry of Unification (MU) spokesman has stated that the visits will have a positive catalytic effect on North-South relations, [redacted] have voiced concern over possible setbacks in the agenda of inter-Korean exchanges and questioned whether North Korea has enough experts to keep all the channels of dialogue going. [redacted] worry that there may be an imbalance between the speed of actual easing in hostilities, perception of the process, and the political response it invokes. They also worry that the expansion of relations between North Korea and the U.S. will allow North Korea to take less interest in North-South relations. If the North has adopted a two-pronged policy of engaging with both Seoul and Washington, the slow-down is seen of little consequence. However, if the North has shifted its diplomatic effort exclusively to Washington now that it secured economic gains from the South, it is seen as a matter of grave concern. This would reinforce the apprehension shared by the seeming lack of equivalency in returns to the two Koreas and fuel skepticism that North Korea is exploiting engagement for short-term tactical gains.

2. (S) Meanwhile there are worries about ramifications of the particular steps being taken toward the establishment of peace. In the Joint Communiqué issued after Special Envoy Cho's visit, there was a reference to changing the condition to a peace arrangement and there was mention of the four party process.

[redacted] On the other hand, there are significant questions about the North's sincerity and whether the North Korea will insist on a peace agreement with the U.S. and try to exclude or subordinate US interests.

3. (S) EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS [redacted]

COORDINATION: None [redacted]

OSD 1.4 (b), (d) + OSD
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552
(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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(4)

5 September 2000

(U) Background paper

~~(S)~~ SUBJECT: South Korean Perspectives on the Republic of Korea-U.S. Security Relationship

I. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (U) Bilateral Overview: Summit Shock & Security Strategy Security.

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Domestic Political Context:

[REDACTED]

DOS 1.4(c)

DIA 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

DOS

RETURNED TO ORIGINATING AGENCY -Dept. of Defense

RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE 1.4(D)

08-11-2008

13-M-0880

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)
+

OSD
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10
U.S.C. 424

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[REDACTED]

- (21/07) Various opinion polls show that a substantial majority believes U.S. forces have deterred war and remain necessary. However, a majority also believes that U.S. troops serve Washington's interests more than Seoul's. Only one in five accept the Kim administration's support for an American troop presence after reunification while the majority holds that troops should be withdrawn in stages paralleling progress in inter-Korean relations. Generally, the younger the individual, the less support for U.S. forces.

a. (U) The Traditional Security Paradigm, Military Strategy and the Combined Defense.

- (21/07) Throughout most of the lifespan of the ROK, security concerns have been so central that South Korean-U.S. security issues dominated overall foreign relations. Although the United States has continued to play a central role in South Korea's foreign and security policy, changes in international and national conditions in the 1990s enabled the South to break out of its pre-occupation with the United States. Favorable trends in inter-Korean relations may create an opportunity for Seoul to fold its security relationship with the U.S. into a larger regional security environment. Under such a paradigm the security relationship with the U.S. will still be the most important bilateral tie, but security links with other states will increase in relative importance as part of an overall comprehensive security approach that will embrace economic and diplomatic considerations as well.

- (21/07) For four decades the U.S. and ROK held convergent conceptions of peninsula security. The U.S. provided overarching strategy and operational planning, ensuring American commitment. As the relationship has changed, the U.S. has had to make adjustments to its role in the region.

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d) Dos 1.4 (d)

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d. (S//NF) Thickett About Alliance Evolution




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OSD 1.4 (b),(d)
DoS 1.4(d)

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2 (U) EXTRACTED DEVELOPMENTS



DOS 1.4(d)

DIA 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(3);
10 U.S.C. 424

OSD 1.4 (b),(d)
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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424

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(12)

27 October 2000

(U) Background Paper

(U) SUBJECT: South Korean Approach to Military Confidence Building Measures with North Korea

1. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (U) South Korean (KS) security experts' views on arms control are derived from extensive preparations by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) Arms Control Office and the MND-funded Korea Institute of Defense Analysis. Much of this work involved joint research with U.S. think tanks. While larger political forces will modify the MND perspective, this earlier work defines the baseline approaches to confidence building measures (CBMs).

b. (U) The MND Arms Control Office defines arms control as "a strategic concept that aims to strengthen security by minimizing the risk of war through inspection, restriction, prohibition or reduction of the building, deployment and operation of certain military forces under a mutual agreement of related nations." The goal is the creation of a stable military balance based on common security rather than "absolute security." Arms control measures include: 1) CBMs which alleviate distrust and tension through transparency and predictability of military forces and activities; 2) arms limitations which constrain the quantitative or qualitative military capabilities; and 3) arms reductions.

c. (U) South Korean planners believe that there are four pre-conditions for successful arms control between hostile states: 1) mutual acceptance of the status quo or how it can should be modified; 2) shared perception that arms control is in the common interest and can produce mutual benefits; 3) shared confidence in defense capabilities based on rough military parity; and 4) some alleviation of hostility and distrust as a result of larger political reconciliation.

Classified by: [redacted]
Declassify on: [redacted]
Date of Source Eval: [redacted]

DFA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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13-M-0880

14-M-3327

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
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RECOMMEND PARTIAL RELEASE 1.4(D)

OSD 1.4 (b) 1(d) + OSO
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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COORDINATION: N/A



1 Enclosure

Some Perspectives from the Pen of Ambassador Lim Dong Won

DIA 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

OSD 1.4 (b), (d) + ^{OSD} 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. 424

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